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NOTE
Access to Discretionary Relief Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act
Castillo-Felix v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979)
Bautista Castillo-Felix, petitioner, unlawfully entered the United
States from Mexico in 1963,' but was apprehended seven years later by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as an illegal alien.
After being granted a voluntary departure pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(g), 2 he was permitted to remain in the United States due to a
series of extensions granted by the INS pending his receipt of a per-
manent resident visa. The visa was granted and petitioner lawfully
entered the United States on April 7, 1972. Petitioner was convicted
in August 1975 of knowingly inducing the entry of two illegal aliens
into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (4),' and was
1. Castillo-Felix v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 601 F,2d 459, 461
(9th Cir. 1979). All facts of the case are taken from the Court's characterization
of the facts and from the respective briefs.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1976) provides:
If any alien, subject to supervision or detention under subsections (c)
or (d) of this section, is able to depart from the United States under
the order of deportation, except that he is financially unable to pay his
passage, the Attorney General may in his discretion permit such alien
to depart voluntarily, and the expense of such passage to the country
to which he is destined may be paid from the appropriation for the
enforcement of this chapter unless such payment is otherwise provided
for under this chapter.
3. 8 U.S,C. § 1324(a)(4) (1976) provides:
(a) Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, com-
manding officer, agent, or consignee of any means of transportation
who- . . .
(4) willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to
encourage or induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the
United States of-
any alien, including an alien crewman, not duly admitted by an im-
migration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the
United States under the terms of this chapter or any other law relating
to the immigration or expulsion of aliens, shall be guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
$2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both,
for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsection occurs:
Provided, however, That for the purpose of this section, employment
(including the usual and. normal practices incident to employment) shall
not be deemed to constitute harboring.
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consequently incarcerated.' The INS commenced deportation pro-
ceedings against him based on this conviction in which petitioner con-
ceded deportability, but sought discretionary relief under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(c).' The Immigration Judge denied such relief because peti-
tioner had not been continuously domiciled in the United States for
seven years subsequent to his admission for permanent resident status
in 1972.6 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed with the
Immigration Judge and affirmed on the same ground of statutory
ineligibility.7 The petitioner next sought review of the BIA order
denying him discretionary relief from deportation by way of petition
to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals." The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed: (1) to be eligible for
§ 1182(c) discretionary relief from deportation, aliens must attain
seven years of lawful unrelinquished domicile after their admission for
permanent resident status; and (2) the equal protection rights of the
alien were not violated when he was prosecuted in the Ninth Circuit
and thereby subjected to a less favorable statutory interpretation than
he would have received had he been prosecuted in the Second Circuit,
since any discriminatory effect resulting from the conflicting statutory
interpretations was due solely to the independence of the federal
appellate courts. Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 'F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979).
Castillo-Felix entered into a common law marriage with an
alien holding permanent resident status in 1963. He subsequently
(b) No officer or person shall have authority to make any arrests for
a violation of any provision of this section except officers and employees
of the Service designated by the Attorney General, either individually
or as a member of a class, and all other officers whose duty it is to en-
force criminal laws.
4. 601 F.2d at 461.
5. 8 U.S.C. § 118 2 (c) (1976) provides:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily
proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation,
and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven
consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney
General without regard to the provisions of paragraphs (1) to (25),
(30), and (31) of subsection (a) of this section. Nothing contained
in this subsection shall limit the authority of the Attorney General to
exercise the discretion vested in him under section 1181 (b) of this title.
6. 601 F.2d at 461. In an oral opinion, the judge added that even if peti-
tioner had met the domicile requirement, he would have exercised his discretion
to deny relief.
7. id.
8. Such review is proper pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1976), which
makes 28 U.S.C. § 308 applicable to orders of deportation and exclusion.
NOTE
legitimatized the relationship in an official meremony in 1970. During
these seven years, Castillo-Felix purchased a home and supported his
family, which included five children. Thus, Castillo-Felix established
and extended ties to the United States over a period of twelve years.
In spite of these "roots," however, both the BIA and the Circuit Court
denied him access to the discretionary relief available under § 1182(c),
on the grounds that he was ineligible for such relief as he had not
accumulated seven years of lawful unrelinquished domicile subsequent
to his admission for permanent residence in 1972.'
The decision in this case is significant, then, for a number of rea-
sons. Besides being obviously unfavorable to the petitioner, as it
denies him even the chance of obtaining discretionary relief from
deportation,1" the decision has broad consequences as well. It denies
other similarly situated aliens who face either deportation or exclusion
access to the sanctuary afforded by § 1182. The decision is paradoxi-
cal in that it directly conflicts with the humanitarian policies upon
which the statutory provision was formulated and enacted." Since
courts are obliged to independently construe statutory provisions,' 2 it
is arguable that § 1182 is not judicially manageable and ought to be
revised by Congress so that it may better serve and embrace the hu-
manitarian purposes for which it was designed. Thus, the decision's
primary significance lies in its use as a guidepost for determining when
and under what facts and circumstances courts may choose to decide
9. 601 F.2d at 461. Contra, Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977). The
Lok court, per Chief Judge Kaufman, rejected the INS interpretation of § 1182(c),
The Court examined the language of § 1182(c) and noted that "admission for
permanent residence" was carefully defined but that "lawful unrelinquished
domicile" is not defined in the Act. It further neted that some aliens may be
lawfully domiciled in the United States without having been admitted for perma-
nent residence. From this, the Court reasoned that lawful domicile could not be
equated with admission for permanent residence. The Court then studied the
legislative history of § 1182(c) and concluded that Congress never intended to
require that seven years of lawful domicile follow admission for permanent resi-
dence. In reaching its conclusion, the Court attached significance to the fact
that Congress considered and rejected a version of § 1182(c) which would have
explicitly provided for such a requirement.
10. Since petitioner was charged under federal criminal law, presumably, he
could apply for a Presidential pardon pursuant to Article II, section 2 of the
U.S. Constitution. One can only speculate on the probability of obtaining such
a pardon. However, petitioner was obligated pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c)
(1976) to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him as of right prior
to his seeking judicial review of his deportation order.
11. See note 17 supra.
12. Alexander v. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 441 U.S. 39, 49 (1979).
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cases of statutory construction involving aliens contrary to apparent
congressional intent and policy.
The second primary reason for the significance of the decision is
the manner in which the Circuit Court handled petitioner's equal
protection claim. Of particular interest is the rule of law the Court
formulated pertaining to the equal protection claim and the dissent's
failure to even discuss equal protection in Castillo-Felix."5 The deci-
sion has potentially broad overtones in the handling of alien deporta-
tion and exclusion cases and, therefore, warrants careful analysis. A
brief background will prove useful at the outset.
I. BACKGROUND
The life situation of aliens residing in the United States is indeed
difficult. The mere label of "alien" connotes something of strange or
foreign character 14 and presupposes the existence of a group to which
other individuals do not belong and are thus different. Such a group
is presumably comprised of persons, all of whom share some normative
value structure."5 It logically follows that an alien, as defined by the
hypothetical group, is one whose values do not coincide with those of
the group. When such a group attempts to control its existence and
ensure its destiny by recognizing, embracing, and giving form to these
normative values, the result is a body of laws. Presumably, then, laws
dealing with aliens have at their core these notions of "groupness" and
normative value structure. The statutory definition of alien reflects
this philosophy."6
13. Presumably, in arguing against a particular construction of a statutory
provision, one would muster all the legal ammunition one could against that con-
struction, including any equal protection objections. The dissent's failure to
address the equal protection issue suggests a firm belief that the case could have
been resolved on the statutory ground, in which case it would have been unnec-
essary to reach the constitutional issue of equal protection. This reasoning is in
line with the established judicial principle that if there exists a nonconstitutional
basis on which to resolve the issues, the court will do so before reaching the
constitutional issues. See, e.g., Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979).
14. WEBSTER'S TmrD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 22 (7th ed. 1972).
15. P. ZIMBARDO, E. EBBESEN, C. MASLACH, INFLUENCING ATTITUDES AND
CHANCINc BEH.AvIoR 42 (2d ed. 1977).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (3) defines alien as any person not a citizen or na-
tional of the United States. That this definition is worded in exclusive terms
means that Congress embraced these notions of groupness with respect to aliens.
NOTE
The underlying policy of the original Immigration and Nation-
ality Laws, 7 and one still embodied in the more contemporary acts,1"
is the travel control of citizens and aliens.'9 The post-war trend in
immigration law was characterized by a reformulation of many of the
older provisions," resulting in the Immigration and Nationality Act
(the Act).21 The Act is an attempt to effectuate the policy of the
protection of United States' borders from encroachment by certain
classes of foreigners, 22 while according such foreigners the benefits
17. See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 878 (1917).
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976).
20. See F. AuERBACH, TIE IMmiGRATiON AND NATIONALITY ACT (1952);
COMMON COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN UNITY, THE ALIEN AND THE IMMIGRATION LAW
(1972); W. BIsoN, ALIENS AND TIE LAW (1940); S. KANSAS, UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION (3d ed. 1948).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976); U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 91-101 (94th ed. 1973). In 1972, 64,209
immigrants from Mexico entered the United States. This number represented
the highest total immigration to the United States from any country in the world.
Mexico has been the greatest source of immigrant influx consistently since 1960.
Also, more Mexican-born persons have been admitted to this country as non-
immigrants than any other country in the world since 1960.
In 1972, the number of aliens reporting addresses under the Alien Address
Program was the highest for aliens of Mexican nationality. This number consti-
tuted 17.7% of the total number reporting to the government. Of the total
number reporting, the highest number and highest percentage (23%) were resid-
ing in California. For 1972, Mexico ranked eighth in the total number of natu-
ralized aliens. California ranked second in state of residence of aliens naturalized,
just behind New York (18.9% versus 21.3% of total aliens naturalized in 1972).
In 1977, 44,000 Mexican-born immigrants entered the United States, ranking
third behind the West Indies and Cuba. In 1977, of 8,499 aliens admitted to
the United States, 897 were expelled (deported or required to depart). Of the
total number of aliens admitted, 935 deportable aliens from Mexico were appre-
hended.
The leading cause for alien deportation since 1951 has been entry without
inspection or by false statements. In comparison, the least-cited cause for alien
deportation is criminal or narcotics laws violations.
In 1977, and for several years prior to that, approximately 17,000 immigra-
tion prosecutions were processed. These actions resulted in between 15,000 and
16,000 convictions. Thus, approximately ninety percent of these prosecutions
resulted in convictions.
In 1977, the number of deportable Mexicans located swelled to about 800,000.
This corresponded to just over that number of total deportable aliens located
(812,500). In border patrol activities for 1977, 138,800 aliens were found
smuggled into the United States. In 1977, more Mexicans were admitted into
the United States as non-immigrants than from any other country.
Of all aliens reporting addresses to the U.S. government in 1977, 19.4% were
from Mexico, a higher total than from any other country. California had the
highest percentage (25.4%) of reporting aliens as far as state of residence. Cali-
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of due process and equal protection of the laws of the United States.-2
In this manner, the laws of the United States espouse a more human-
itarian approach to the disposition of aliens.
The humanitarian aspects of the Immigration and Nationality
Act are reflected in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c),2 . the statutory provision un-
der which Castillo-Felix sought, and the Circuit Court denied him,
relief from deportation. The Court noted that the thrust of § 1182(c)
is to provide those aliens having established roots in the United States
with a remedy against exclusion or deportation. 5 Common examples
of established roots are a family, a permanent residence, and a job.
Courts, based on their conviction that "deportation is a sanction which
in severity surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal penalties,"26
supposedly consider these factors in deciding exclusion and deporta-
tion cases.
Castillo-Felix had established roots in the United States, yet the
BIA ordered, and the Circuit Court affirmed, the harsh penalty of
deportation. The following analysis will offer some illumination on
this point.
II. ANALYSiS
The analysis of the decision involves a tripartite discussion. The
first part is a focus on the value structure behind the particular as-
pects of the decision. This will entail a scrutiny of the major prem-
ises behind the Court's reasoning. The second part of the discussion
is concerned with the credibility of the decision. This demands a
survey of the authorities cited for the major premises of reasoning.
fornia ranked second to New York in state of residence of aliens naturalized in
1977.
U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
83-96 (100th ed. 1979).
23. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971); Calvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
24. Lok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 548 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.
1977); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Anwo,
Interim Decision #2604 (BIA 1977), aff'd sub. nom. Anwo v. INS, 607 F.2d
435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (acknowledging that the 7th Proviso to § 3 of the Immi-
gration Act of 1917, the predecessor to § 1182(c), is a humanitarian statute
designed to mitigate the harsh effects of the immigration laws). Contra, Brief
for Respondent at 17-18, Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979).
25. 601 F.2d at 462.
26. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1977).
NOTE
The third portion of the analysis is a crystallization of the decision,
which serves the function of stating and clarifying the rule of law
derived from the case. This will also place the decision in perspective
with respect to future cases. Throughout the discussion, the dissent's
arguments will be introduced and analyzed as they relate to the major
arguments of the decision.
A. Statutory Interpretation
Petitioner sought relief from deportation under 8 U.S.G. § 1182
(c),2- a provision originally applicable to exclusion proceedings only.
28
The Court disposed of this preliminary statutory applicability prob-
lem by noting three established rationales for extending § 1182(c) to
deportation proceedings where the deportees meet the statutory re-
quirements. 2' The court's apparent ease in acceptance of the exten-
sion of § 1182(c) to include relief for deportable, as well as excludable,
aliens is misleading. A broad interpretation of § 1182(c) is sug-
gested by such an extension since the provision makes no reference
to deportable aliens." Upon closer analysis, however, it becomes
evident that the decision of the case represents the simultaneous ex-
pansion of the provision's applicability and the tightening of its require-
ments. It is clear from a recognition of this apparent anomaly that the
27. See note 5 supra.
28. 601 F.2d at 462.
29. Three rationales have been used to extend § 1182(c) relief to de-
portation proceedings. Aliens who committed deportable offenses, then
left the United States but were not excluded upon returning, could re-
quest § 1182(c) relief nune pro tunc. The INS reasoned that the
discretionary relief which would have been available to them on re-entry
could be granted at the later deportation hearing. E.g., Matter of
Tanori, Interim Decision #2467 (BIA 1976); Matter of S, 5 I&N Dec.
392 (BIA 1954).
Alternatively, aliens eligible for voluntary departure in lieu of depor-
tation could obtain advance determinations of their eligibility for
§ 1182(e) relief, to apply to their future re-entry. See Matter of Anwo,
Interim Decision #2604 (BIA 1977), aff'd sub nom. Anwo v. INS,
607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Matter of S, 5 I&N Dec. 116 (BIA
1953).
Finally, the INS allowed deportees to apply for § 1182(c) relief in
connection with an application for adjustment of status, reasoning that
aliens applying for adjustment of status stand in the same position as
those entering this country with a permanent resident visa. Matter of
Smith, Interim Decision #1510 (BIA 1965).
601 F.2d at 462 n.5.
30. See note 5 supra,
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Court's decision is rooted in values other than those represented by a
liberal reading of § 1182(c).
The Court paved the way for its holding when it stated that "the
statutory mandate in § 1182(c) is ambiguous"'" and the "language
of the section could support either the INS interpretation or that
adopted in Lok." ' The premise that § 1182(c) is ambiguous provided
the judges with a clean slate upon which the court could draft its
opinion. Based on their independent evaluation of the language of
the provision, the legislative history, and the structure of the Act,
the Court could have held either way. In holding against petitioner,
the majority gave credence to the established principle that it is not
within the province of the courts to second-guess Congress in inter-
pretations of statutory provisions." In this manner, the Court vas
able to downplay the dissent's argument that Congress had con-
sidered and rejected language which would have explicitly required
admission for permanent residence before establishment of lawful
domicile.3 4 The majority said: "[W]e can only speculate about the
Committee members' reasons for not including this language. They
might have considered it superfluous, believing that the enacted ver-
sion adequately conveyed their intent that admission for permanent
residence precede the seven years of domicile."" This line of reason-
ing allowed the majority to look to authority other than that of legis-
lative history in order to resolve the issues for the case, while still
giving due respect to congressional intent.
The majority found support in the case law for the premise that
the BIA was entitled to due deference regarding its decision below.3
31. 601 F.2d at 464.
32. Id.
33. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). See Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COL. L. REV. 524 (1947). See generally E. Levi,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 27-57 (1949).
It is an established constitutional principle stemming from the separation of
powers doctrine that courts merely sit in judgment of the laws. Thus, courts are
not superlegislatures and cannot make policy decisions of the type made by legis-
latures. This limitation on judicial power prevents courts from substituting lan-
guage in statutory interpretation cases. However, the line between interpretation
and substitution of language is often a gray one.
34. In 1950, the Senate Judiciary Committee considered and rejected a sug-
gestion to include the phrase "established after a lawful entry for permanent
residence" in the Seventh Proviso to section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917,
the precursor to § 1182(c). S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1950).
35. 601 F.2d at 465.
36. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
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They stated that "only a clear showing of a contrary intent by Con-
gress will justify overruling the agency's regulations."3 ' The ma-
jority recognized the "reversal test" applicable to administrative cases,
which was cited in the Lok decision,3 but failed to find that the INS
interpretation of § 1182(c) was inconsistent with the statutory man-
date, or that it frustrated congressional policy.39
The dissent countered the majority's due deference argument
by citing the
established rule of law that statutes affecting deportation decisions
be construed in favor of the alien, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333
U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Lennon v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975); Errico v. INS, 349 F.2d 541,
547 n.3 (9th Cir. 1965).40
This argument stems from the view that deportation is "the forfeiture
for misconduct" while residing in the United States, equivalent to
such drastic measures as banishment or exile.41
While this view is somewhat accurate in cases of deportation, the
dissent's premise that statutes be construed in favor of aliens is a
broadly-based argument. The danger of relying on such a broad
argument is generalization to the point where the argument loses its
persuasive quality. The lattice of facts upon which cases such as
Castillo-Felix rests is too complex and particular to be measured by
such general rules as the dissent would employ. Thus, the dissent,
though correct in what it did espouse, never directly nor adequately
refuted the due deference argument of the majority, leaving the Court
with the two conflicting policy rationales of the dissent and the
majority.
37. 601 F.2d at 465, quoting Baur v. Mathews, 578 F.2d 228, 233 (9th Cir.
1978), and citing DHL Corp. v. C.A.B., 584 F.2d 914, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1978);
Nazareno v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 512 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
38. 601 F.2d at 464. The Lok court recognized that despite the fact that
deference is customarily accorded the agency responsible for the administration
of an act, courts have a heavy responsibility to set aside administrative decisions
that are inconsistent with statutory mandates or which frustrate congressional
policy behind the legislation. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1977).
39. 601 F.2d at 467. The majority found the legislative history inconclusive
,on this point and, therefore, not crucial to their reasoning. Rather, the majority
compared § 1182(c) to § 1254(a) and concluded that the INS interpretation
preserved the overall statutory scheme of discretionary relief in deportation.
40. 601 F.2d at 468-69.
41. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
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The dissent did raise important points in countering the majority's
two premises that § 1182(c) limits the class of aliens eligible for
relief,42 and that the class of aliens to which the provision applies
is distinct from, and must possess a stronger relationship with, the
United States than the class of aliens eligible for suspension of depor-
tation under § 1254(a). 43 The majority, relying primarily on legis-
lative history in formulating these premises, 4 also examined section
244(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)] of the Act in an effort to avoid under-
mining other of its provisions.45 The majority concluded that § 1182
(c) had lesser standards than § 1254(a) and that "the alien applying
for section 212(c) [§ 1182(c)] relief has only to show that he is a
lawful permanent resident and that he has maintained a lawful un-
relinquished domicile in the United States for a period of seven con-
secutive years."46
In response, the dissent noted that no explicit constriction of the
class of aliens entitled to § 1182(c) relief was included in that provi-
sion.47  Further, the dissent, arguing against the majority's premise
that § 1182(c) had lesser standards for relief consideration than
§ 1254(a), posited that "such a view certainly ignores the difficult
standard that must be met to even qualify for permanent resident
status," 48 and "[tihe broad discretionary powers available to the Attor-
ney General in granting lawful permanent residence could, and pre-
sumably do, serve a function equal in stringency to the establishment
of good moral character and extreme hardship under § 244(a). 49
The dissent's reasoning on these points is sound. The hardship
and good moral character requirements of § 1254(a) would not be
read out of the Act by the interpretation that an alien with permanent
resident status meets the minimum statutory requirements of the Act's
42. 601 F.2d at 466. The dissenting members of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee viewed §1182(c) as a limitation on the Attorney General's discretion to
readmit aliens with an unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years since
it would require the exclusion of aliens who had voluntarily and temporarily
proceeded abroad, even though they could not have been deported had they
remained in the United States. S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1952).
43. 601 F.2d at 466-67.
44. See In the Matter of S, 5 I&N Dec. 116, 118 (BIA 1953).
45. See Matter of Anwo, Interim Decision #2604 (BIA 1977), aff'd sub nom.
Anwo v. INS, 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (the majority's reasoning adopts
that of the second section of the agency opinion).
46. 601 F.2d at 466.
47. Id. at 468. See note 5 supra.
48. Id. at 469.
49. Id,
NOTE
provisions by accumulating at least seven years of developing ties to
the United States.5" Such an interpretation is supported by the fact
that circumstances exist where aliens are immediately eligible for
lawful permanent resident status (i.e., marriage to an American citi-
zen). This interpretation is especially warranted where the equities
balance in favor of the alien, as with Castillo-Felix, who began es-
tablishing roots in the United States in 1963 and satisfied U.S. govern-
ment officials in 1972 of his potential as an American citizen.5' Aliens
eligible for § 1254(a) relief need only live in the United States be-
tween seven and ten years. Under the INS interpretation of § 1182(c),
an alien who obtained permanent resident status must add seven years
to those already spent developing ties to the United States without
permanent resident status. Such incongruity between interpretations
of these provisions of the Act yields harsh and often unjust results.
Certainly, this is one intention Congress never had in enacting these
provisions.
B. Equal Protection
The disparate interpretation of § 1182 by the Ninth Circuit and
the Second Circuit was the foundation of petitioner's equal protec-
tion claim. The majority disposed of this claim in four short para-
graphs.12  After recognizing that the principle of equal protection
is a component of the Fifth Amendment due process clause,5 3 to
which aliens are entitled," the majority limited its inquiry to one of
minimum scrutiny under the rational basis test.55
The majority next stated that federal appellate courts are in-
dependent and that the decision of one court of appeals, in and of
itself, cannot bind another.56 Thus, the INS was not compelled to
follow the Lok decision outside the Second Circuit. 7 The majority
50. The dissent would have it that the hardship and good moral character
requirements of § 1254(a) be regarded as explanatory of the discretionary powers
available or repetitious of a policy underlying the entire Act. Id.
51. Id. at 462.
52. Id. at 467.
53. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
54. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
55. 601 F.2d at 467, citing Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976).
For a discussion of the equal protection tests applicable in alienage cases, see
Note, Erosion of the Strict Scrutiny Standard as Applied to Resident Aliens, 10
LAW. AM. 1049 (1978).
56. 601 F.2d at 467.
57. 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979). See Matter of Lim, 13 I&N Dec. 169
(BIA 1969); 1 C. GORDON AND H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCE-
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espoused the notion that refusal to adopt the Lok riling in the Second
Circuit in order to achieve consistency in application of the law would
"only invite appeal and reversal."" s The Court concluded that the
agency's decision to apply the Lok rule only in the Second Circuit
avoided "this unnecessary process of appeal," 9 and that this was a
"sound and rational basis for the agency's action." '6 In affirming the
BIA decision, the majority held that "[a]dherence to the law of the
circuit only within that circuit does not violate petitioner's equal pro-
tection rights." 1
The equal protection portion of the opinion presents some prob-
lems. The first problem involves the majority's self-imposed limita-
tion to the rational basis test. The court asserted, citing Francis v.
INS,6 2 that "the right of a permanent resident alien to remain in this
country has never been held to be the type of 'fundamental right'
which would subject classification touching on it to strict judicial
scrutiny." 65 This was not the real point of petitioner's claim, however.
DURE § 1.10e, at 1-77 (1979). See also Matter of Amado and Monteiro, 13
I&N Dec. 179 (BIA 1969).
58. 601 F.2d at 467.
59. id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Respondent's Brief states:
[I]t would be patently unfair to require the [BIA and INS] to follow
the ruling of a single United States Court of Appeals throughout the
United States. If such were the rule, then the first Court to address an
issue would have binding authority over all the other federal courts,
with the only recourse being an appeal to the Supreme Court. The
decisions of one federal circuit court were never intended to be binding
on other federal courts and they are not binding on the [BIA] outside
the jurisdiction of that Court. Consequently, the BIA's decision ...
was not a violation of petitioner's Fifth Amendment guarantees of due
process and equal protection of law.
Brief for Respondent at 26-27, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979).
62. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
63. Id. at 272. The court found § 1182(c) unconstitutional as applied to
that petitioner. Francis was found to be deportable by the INS by reason of
a marijuana conviction. He sought discretionary relief from deportation pursu-
ant to § 1182(c). The BIA denied him such relief because he had not fulfilled
the departure requirement under § 1182(c). The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, per Judge Lumbard, stated:
Reason and fairness would suggest that an alien whose ties with this
country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial entry
should receive at least as much consideration as an individual who may
leave and return from time to time.
Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent resident aliens who are
in like circumstances, but for i-relevant and fortuitous factors, be treated
in a like manner.
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d at 273.
NOTE
Castillo-Felix never argued that he was "fundamentally" entitled to
remain in this country, but rather that the disparate application of
§ 1182(c) offended the guarantee of equal protection of the laws by
allowing aliens who happen to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Second Circuit to be eligible for § 1182(c) discretionary relief, while
denying that same right to aliens outside the Second Circuit (himself
in particular). More simply stated, petitioner's equal protection claim
is based on the fact that certain aliens facing identical sanctions un-
der federal law are accorded more, or less, rights based solely on a
geographical distinction. The majority failed to adequately come to
grips with these practical consequences of ruling against petitioner's
equal protection claim."
A second problem with the majority's handling of petitioner's
equal protection claim is derived from their statement that "the dis-
criminatory effect arising from the agency's decision results entirely
from the independence of federal appellate courts."" In this posture,
the majority failed to realize that the judiciary is vested with the duty
to protect those within its jurisdiction from unfair treatment under
the law no matter what the source of such treatment. This includes
prevention of arbitrary discrimination. It is untenable that a judi-
ciary, charged with ensuring equal protection of the laws, would
permit invidious discrimination based solely upon geographical dif-
ferences, the effects of which are felt only through judicial fiat.
A third problem with the majority's handling of the equal protec-
tion issue is their reference to the fact that "the agency's decision to
apply the Lok interpretation in the Second Circuit [only] avoids futile
appeals, costly to both the agency and to petitioners seeking relief.""'
Presumably, the petitioner who applies for § 1182(c) relief in the
first place wants to remain in the United States enough to pay the
64. The adherence to the rational basis test was proper under these facts and
circumstances. Strict judicial scrutiny of a statute or its application is usually
triggered when the statute creates a classification based on alienage which some-
how discriminates against that group being classified. It is apparent that the
statutory scheme does not discriminate against aliens based on their alienage.
The statute mandates deportation of all aliens who are found to have been in-
volved in certain specified misconduct. The disparity of treatment of which
petitioner in this case complained was not accomplished through any statutory
classification or misapplication of law. The disparity was the result of different
interpretations of the law, which was held proper in this circumstance, since
federal courts are free to independently interpret statutes within their purview.
65. 601 F.2d at 467,
66. Id,
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costs of the available appeal processes and willingly so. To presume
otherwise would mean that deportable aliens would readily accept
their deportation as inevitable and never apply for § 1182(c) relief
at the outset. Such is not the case.
This reference to "costly appeals" is even more curious than is
readily apparent. It suggests an economically-rooted decision rather
than one rooted in law or social policy. The problem with economi-
cally-rooted decisions is that the courts are not always the best econo-
mists, nor do they always have reliable information on which to base
economic choices.6" Thus, the conclusion by the majority that the
agency's avoidance of the costly appeal process was a sound and ra-
tional basis for its action was one reached in sacrifice of the uniformity
of application of federal law and in the absence of any evidence on
the costs of appeals. The Court's decision cannot be described as
well-founded, then, for it failed to sufficiently manifest a rational basis
for the agency's action."
C. Authorities for the Court's Decision
The credibility of the Castillo-Felix decision can be further ana-
lyzed by examining the authorities on which the court relied to deter-
mine whether or not they support the reasoning in the case. The
Anwo " decision was most heavily relied upon by the majority through-
out its opinion. It was cited in support of the INS interpretation of
67. It is not apparent from what source the majority obtained its "costly
appeals" reasoning. No such argument was proffered by the U.S. government in
the Brief for Respondent. If the majority took judicial notice of the costs of the
appeal processes, it would have been helpful to note this in a footnote. This
is especially important if the majority's treatment of appeal economics as crucial
to the decision is to be taken seriously. Equally perplexing is the majority's use
of "futile" to describe the Second Circuit appeals that would supposedly flow
from the INS' refusal to adopt the Lok interpretation of § 1182(c) in that circuit,
and thereby achieve consistency of application of this important federal law. It
is not within the province of federal judges to decide the merits of taking appeals;
this is the litigant's role. Furthermore, it is beyond a circuit court judge's role
to direct another circuit court in the management of its docket. Arguably, the
court in Castillo-Felix did this with respect to the Second Circuit.
68. One conceivable rational basis for the BIA's action is the reasoning which
led them to their particular interpretation of the statute. It is this statutory
interpretation which ultimately decided the case and not the Court's view of the
costliness of the appellate process. Thus, the Court would have given a clearer,
more understandable decision if it cited the BIA's reasoning behind its statutory
interpretation as the rational basis for its action.
69. Matter of Anwo, Interim Decision #2604 (BIA 1977), aff'd sub nora.
Anwo v. INS, 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
NOTE
§ 1182(c) relief eligibility where the Court stated that "[the INS]
has consistently applied § 1182(c) only to aliens domiciled in this
country for seven or more years after their admission for permanent
residence." 7 0 The majority's reliance on Anwo will likely cause future
confusion. The BIA decision in that case did support the interpreta-
tion of § 1182(c) adopted by the majority in Castillo-Felix; however,
at the time of the appeal in the instant case, the appeal of the BIA
decision in Anwo was already decided by the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals. That court did not decide the case on the
statutory interpretation basis put forth by the majority in Castillo-
Felix, but rather on the legal technicality that Anwo, as a non-
immigrant student, could not have met the domicile requirement
under either interpretation of § 1182(c)." Thus, the future use of
Anwo and Castillo-Felix together as authority for the interpretation
of § 1182(c) which requires that aliens must accumulate seven years
of lawful unrelinquished domicile after their admission for permanent
residence is suspect.
The majority also cited the BIA decision of Matter of S" in sup-
port of the INS interpretation of § 1182(c). The Board there relied
on the legislative background to § 1182(c), particularly Senate Report
No. 151573 and House Report No. 1365.14; both reports were quoted
extensively in the Brief for Respondent." Neither of these reports,
however, is conclusive on the question of whether or not the seven
years of domicile must accrue after admission for permanent residence.
The Senate Report stated:
The suggestion was made that if the words "established after a
lawful entry for permanent residence" were inserted in the 7th
proviso to qualify the domicile of the alien it would effectively
eliminate practically all of the objectionable features, and at the
same time the Attorney General would be left with sufficient dis-
cretionary authority to admit any lawfully resident aliens return-
ing from a temporary visit abroad to a lawful domicile of 7 consec-
utive years.
The subcommittee recommends that the proviso should be lim-
ited to aliens who have the status of lawful permanent residence
70. 601 F.2d at 463.
71. Id. at n.7.
72. In the Matter of S, 5 I&N Dec. 116 (BIA 1953).
73. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1950).
74. H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1952). This text is in-
cluded verbatim in S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1952).
75. Brief for Respondent at 8-10, 17, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979).
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who are returning to a lawful domicile of 7 consecutive years after
a temporary absence abroad 7 6
The above-quoted phrase was omitted from the final draft of § 1182
(c), however, and the subcommittee recommendation that remained
is ambiguous. Aliens who have the status of lawful permanent resi-
dence may have such status for less than seven years and still return
to a lawful domicile of seven consecutive years after a temporary
absence abroad. The only way to avoid this possibility is to define
"lawful unrelinquished domicile" with the prerequisite of "lawful per-
manent residence" status. This is precisely what the court did in
Castillo-Felix, but its authority for doing so is not clearly based on
the legislative history of § 1182(c). The House Report compared
the then-existing law to the new provision of § 1182(c):
Under present law in the case of an alien returning after a tem-
porary absence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of 7
consecutive years, he may be admitted in the discretion of the At-
torney General under such circumstances as the Attorney General
may prescribe. Under existing law the Attorney General is thus
empowered to waive the grounds of exclusion in the case of an
alien returning under the specified circumstances even though the
alien had never been lawfully admitted to the United States. The
comparable discretionary authority invested in the Attorney General
in section 212(c) of the bill is limited to cases where the alien had
-been previously admitted for lawful permanent residence and has
proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under order of deportation.
77
This paragraph is likewise ambiguous. The meaning of the term
"previously admitted for lawful permanent residence" is unclear from
this passage. The term is susceptible to an interpretation which re-
quires aliens to have lawful permanent residence prior to going abroad
only. This interpretation would not include the requirement that
such status be acquired prior to the seven year period of unrelin-
quished domicile. Again, to interpret the provisions of § 1182(c)
as the court did in Castillo-Felix, one must establish that lawful per-
manent resident status is a definitive prerequisite to the seven year
lawful unrelinquished domicile requirement. This is a necessary link
in the chain of reasoning that led to the rule of law formulated by the
Court.
76. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1950).
77. H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1952).
NOTE
D. The Rule of Law
The rule of law gleaned from the case of Castillo-Felix v. INS 78
may be stated in any of the following ways. Aliens seeking discre-
tionary relief from deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) must
accumulate seven years of lawful unrelinquished domicile after their
admission as permanent residents to be eligible under that provi-
sion. More broadly worded, the rule is that to be eligible for § 1182
(c) relief, aliens must have seven years of lawful unrelinquished
domicile subsequent to their attaining permanent resident status. A
narrow form of the rule is that in the BIA case of a deportable alien
who petitioned for discretionary relief from deportation pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), the BIA correctly denied the resident alien relief
on the statutory ineligibility ground that aliens must accumulate seven
years of lawful unrelinquished domicile after their admission as per-
manent residents.
Broadly stated, the rule of law pertaining to equal protection is
that adherence to the law of the circuit only within that circuit does
not violate the equal protection rights of an alien. A narrow for-
mulation of this rule is that the BIA decision to follow the Second
Circuit interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) only within that circuit,
and to retain its own interpretation outside the Second Circuit, did
not violate petitioner's equal protection rights where petitioner was
denied relief by virtue of the less favorable INS interpretation be-
cause the agency had a rational basis for its actions.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The decision in Castillo-Felix both clarified and muddled parts
of immigration law surrounding 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). Clearly, the
decision placed the Ninth Circuit in direct conflict with the Second
Circuit with regard to the statutory requirements for eligibility under
§ 1182(c).7 9 The Second Circuit after Lok may no longer require
that the seven years of lawful unrelinquished domicile follow admis-
sion for permanent residence in order for an alien to qualify for
§ 1182(c) relief. The Castillo-Felix decision reaffirms this require-
ment in the Ninth Circuit.
One point of statutory eligibility not specifically addressed in
this section is the departure requirement of § 1182(c).11O Although
78. 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979).
79. Id. at 467 (Takasugi, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 462.
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the majority dealt with this requirement in an early footnote,81 it
specifically stated that "we need not resolve an apparent conflict be-
tween this circuit and the Second Circuit."12 The Court maintained
that petitioner would fail to qualify for relief if the departure require-
ment was an issue in the case.83  The dissent noted that the Francis
decision made the viability of the departure requirement questionable
in the Ninth Circuit and eliminated it in the Second Circuit.8 4 Thus,
it appears that the departure requirement still has effect in the Ninth
Circuit if we trust the language found in the majority's dicta and
footnotes.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, Castillo-Felix stands as a legal roadblock in the
alien's path toward § 118 2 (c) discretionary relief. This decision ap-
plies to aliens who fail to accumulate seven years of lawful unrelin-
quished domicile after their admission for permanent residence,
regardless of the degree to which they have established roots in the
United States. The decision also fosters a disparate application of
§ 1182(c), creating a situation in which similarly situated deportable
aliens may be accorded greater protection under law in the Second
Circuit than outside that circuit. This is accomplished solely on the
basis of a differing interpretation of § 1182(c). Such a situation is
in disharmony with the policy favoring uniformity of federal law ap-
plication. It appears, then, that unless the federal courts or the
Supreme Court" can decipher the "true" meaning of § 1182(c) in
future cases, there will evolve a dual line of cases under that provision
until Congress deems it appropriate to step in via the repeal and
amendment process.""
Jeffrey Marcus*
81. Id. at n.6.
82. Id.
83. Id. (recognizing that the Ninth Circuit retained the departure require-
ments in Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972)).
84. 601 F.2d at 470 n.4.
85. The Supreme Court may properly grant certiorari to appeals from circuit
courts of appeals to resolve conflicting interpretations of federal law. See Alex-
ander v. HUD, 441 U.S. 39, 49 (1979).
86. It should be noted that the BIA's decision in the Lok case on remand
may resolve some of the differences discussed herein. That is, a BIA decision
requiring attainment of the seven year lawful domicile requirement subsequent
to obtaining admission for permanent residence would align the Second and
Ninth Circuits and render the equal protection arguments moot.
' J. D. Candidate, University of Miami School of Law; Reports Editor, Lawyer
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